The battle of Plataea[1]
Antonis Mystriotis
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Abstract
The battle of Plataea, which was the greatest land battle of the classical
era, is presented under a new perspective. The exact words of Herodotus are
carefully analysed in order to better understand the battle tactics and reason
the outcome. It is suggested that during the last day of the battle, the Greek
commanders, while they came under serious pressure by the Persian cavalry, devised an ingenious stratagem for trapping the Persians
in a region of the battlefield which was not suitable for cavalry attacks. The
main concept of this complex strategic plan was that the Spartan regiment
assisted by the Tegeans was separated from the bulk of the Greek army assuming
the role of bait, while the Athenians guided by the Plataeans hid
among the hills of Asopos Ridge. The Persians not seeing the Athenians took the
risk to attack the isolated Spartans in a region of the battlefield which was
unfavourable for the cavalry expecting that their numerical superiority was
sufficient for the victory. When the hiding Athenians attacked, the Persian
line collapsed, Mardonius was killed, and the Greeks won a brilliant victory.
1. Introduction
Despite the fact that the last book of Herodotus’
Histories is mainly dedicated to the battle of Plataea, its details remain
obscure and uncertain. Although Herodotus presented the battle in length, his
narration is vague and self-contradicting in many points. Recent scientific
works (Shepherd, 2012; Cartledge, 2013) further clarified an older historical
analysis (Green 1996), and revived the interest for this great battle in which
the freedom of Greece was decided. However, many questions still remain open. In
particular the events of the last day of the battle are difficult to explain,
although they are documented in detail by Herodotus. In this article we attempt
to interpret Herodotus’ story by carefully analyzing his exact words. A few
interesting conclusions can be reached by following this approach.
2. Preparations
The battle of Plataea decided the final defeat of the
Persian army in Greece and the definite liberation of all Greece. It was the
greatest land battle which took place in Greece during the 5th
century BC. Approximately 150,000 men[2]
participated in the battle from both sides and it lasted for about 15 days.
Considering that the Greek heavy infantry included more than 35,000 hoplites,
it was one of the greatest battles of all times involving heavily armoured
infantry forming a phalanx. Moreover, the battle was decided on very delicate
tactical moves which are worthwhile to study.
It has to be noted that most probably the battle of
Plataea was not foreseen in the original strategic plan of Themistocles for the
second Persian war[3].
Indeed, the Athenians were expecting that Mardonius would withdraw from Greece
as soon as was informed about the Greek naval expedition to Ionia. That
campaign was setting the Persian possession of Minor Asia in danger and the
communication and supply routes of Mardonius’ army in great risk. Therefore,
the most reasonable scenario was that Mardonius would rush to Ionia to defend
the Persian strongholds there. However, Mardonius against all expectations
decided to stay in Greece and attempted to defeat the Greeks in a decisive
battle.
The Spartans after many hesitations and under pressure
by their non-Peloponnesian allies, Athens, Megara, and Plataea, decided to
dispatch a strong force of 5,000 Spartans assisted by a large number of helots
and 5,000 perioeci[4]
hoplites. This army, which roughly corresponded to half of the total manpower
of Sparta, marched to Isthmus. There, they were joined by other Peloponnesian
allies, who wished to join the expedition.
Once the Lacedaemonians had
reached the Isthmus, they established their camp there. When the rest of the
Peloponnesians (that is, the ones who were on the patriotic side) heard what
the Lacedaemonians were doing, they decided that they should not be left
behind— although some of them did so only when they actually saw the Spartiates
taking to the field. (Herodotus, IX.19)
In the mean time, Mardonius, who had occupied Attica
and burnt Athens for a second time, learnt about the Greek preparations and
returned to Boeotia.
Next Mardonius heard that the
Greeks had gathered in force on the Isthmus, so he turned back again and
marched through Decelea, … to Tanagra, where he bivouacked for the night before
making his way the next day to Scolus, which was within Theban territory. At
Scolus, despite the fact that the Thebans were on the Persian side, he cut down
all the trees on cultivated plots of land, not out of hostility, but because he
really had no choice, since he wanted to have a defensive stockade built for
his troops as a place of refuge in case the battle did not go well for him. His
army was posted along the River Asopus, occupying an extensive stretch of land
from Erythrae, past Hysiae, and all the way into Plataean territory. However,
the actual stronghold which he built was not of course as large as that; it was
square in shape, with each side being about ten stades[5]
long. (Herodotus, IX.15)
The identification of the exact location of the
Mardonius’ camp is a very important element for the correct analysis of the
battle tactics. Despite the information provided by Herodotus, most of the
landmarks he referred to, have either vanished or changed their names.
Specifically, Erythrae and Hysiae were two towns which had been abandoned and
ruined since the Roman times. Pausanias the geographer passed by their ruins in
the 2nd century AD. Today, the exact location of these two towns is
unknown. However, Pausanias reported that their ruins lay by the exit of the
Eleutherae pass in the plain near Plataea. Therefore, the probable location of
Hysiae is modern Kriekouki (Map 1) at the west side of the Eleutherae pass and
Erythrae was probably located east of that road. Considering that Mardonius’
camp lied north of Asopos River, the information given by Herodotus indicates
that the Persian army spanned the area between the roads Thebes – Erythrae and
Thebes – Plataea (Map 1). The most probable location of the fortified Persian
camp was just west of the road Thebes – Erythrae, north of Asopos.
The Peloponnesians marched from Isthmus to Eleusis,
where they were joined by 8,000 Athenian troops, and after crossing Cithaeron
Mountain entered Boeotia.
… the combined (Greek) forces
made their way from the Isthmus to Eleusis, where they once again offered up
sacrifices. The omens were favourable, and so they continued on their way,
accompanied now by the Athenian troops, who had crossed over from Salamis and
joined them at Eleusis. It was when they were at Erythrae in Boeotia that they
found out about the Persian encampment on the Asopos, and then, in the light of
this information, they took up a position opposite the Persians on the spurs of
Mount Cithaeron. (Herodotus, IX.19)
3. Phase 1 –
Days 1-2
As soon as the two armies faced each other, Mardonius
attempted to irritate the Greeks by a vehement cavalry attack in order to lure
them to advance into the plain.
The Greeks persistently
refused to come down from the hills to the plain, so Mardonius sent the whole
of his cavalry against them. The cavalry was commanded by an eminent Persian
called Masistius …, who rode a Nesaean horse, magnificently caparisoned, with
equipment that included a golden bit. The horsemen advanced towards the Greeks
and then attacked regiment by regiment. During these attacks, which inflicted
severe losses on the Greeks, they taunted them by calling them women.
(Herodotus, IX.20)
After a fierce battle between the Persian cavalry and
the hoplites of Megara and Athens assisted by archers, Masistius fell off his
horse and was killed. The Persians were left leaderless and decided to retreat
to their camp. The victorious Greeks advanced cautiously in the lower hills
towards Plataea.
Greek morale was considerably
raised by the fact that they had not only withstood the assaults of the Persian
cavalry, but had actually managed to push them back. … Next, they decided to
come down off the hills and go to Plataea, because the land around there was
clearly far more suitable than Erythrae as a place for them to establish
themselves, for a number of reasons, including the fact that it had a better
supply of fresh water. So they decided to move their camp down to Plataea, and
in particular to the spring called Gargaphia which rises in that region, and to
take up a position there in separate units. They picked up their gear and
marched through the spurs of Cithaeron, past Hysiae, and into Plataean
territory, where they formed up into various units based on their places of
origin. The land they occupied by the Gargaphian Spring and the precinct of the
hero Androcrates consisted of knolls and level ground. (Herodotus, IX.25)
The exact position of the Greek camp has to be derived
from Herodotus’ description despite the difficulty in recognizing vanished or
renamed landmarks, such as Gargaphia spring. It is widely believed that
Gargaphia is the spring Alepotripa near Plataea. Nevertheless, P. Green in his
work “The Greco-Persian wars” identifies it as another spring called Retsi near
the Byzantine chapel of St. Dimitris, correlating this chapel with the location
of monument of Androcrates or the shrine of Demeter mentioned by Herodotus.
Both possible locations of Gargaphia indicate that the Greeks, after their
victory against the Persian cavalry, camped in a hilly area called Asopos
Ridge, south of the river and west of the road going from Erythrae to Thebes
(Map 1). Asopos Ridge is indicated on
Map (1) by the line marking the 310m elevation. Considering that the altitude
of the plain south of Thebes towards Plataea is roughly 270-290m above the sea
level, the small hills forming the complex of Asopos Ridge rose 30-60m above
the plain. Moreover, the riverbeds of a few tributaries of Asopos, which were
dry during the summer, cut deeply the landscape making the terrain very
uncomfortable for a cavalry charge. Since Mardonius’ camp was established north
of Asopos, we may assume that the two camps were facing each other separated by
the river.
Afterwards the Greeks— the
late arrivals as well as the original members of the expedition— formed up at
their posts. The disposition of the forces was as follows. A brigade of 10,000
Lacedaemonians held the right wing; 5,000 of these were Spartiates, and they
were protected by 35,000 light-armed helots, seven for each man. The Spartiates
reserved the place next to them for the Tegeans[6],
in recognition of their prestige and their courage; the Tegean contingent
consisted of 1,500 hoplites. The position next to the Tegeans was taken by the
5,000-strong contingent of Corinthians, who gained Pausanias’ permission to
have the 300 from Potidaea in Pallene stand alongside them. Next came 600
Arcadians from Orchomenus, then a contingent of 3,000 from Sicyon. Next to the
Sicyonians came 800 men from Epidaurus, then 1,000 from Troezen, 200 from
Lepreum, 400 from Mycenae and Tiryns, and then 1,000 from Phleious. Alongside
the Phleiasians stood 300 men from Hermione, then there was a contingent of 600
from Eretria and Styra, then 400 from Chalcis, and then 500 from Ambracia. Next
to the Ambraciots stood 800 men from Leucas and Anactorium, and then 200 from
Pale in Cephallenia. The next contingent consisted of 500 from Aegina, then
there came 3,000 Megarians, 600 Plataeans, and finally, in the forward position
on the left wing, there were 8,000 Athenians under the command of Aristides the
son of Lysimachus. (Herodotus, IX.28)
This is a peculiar and confusing description of the
Greek camp. Herodotus presents the Greek camp similarly to an army arranged in
battle order ready to fight. Camping in a linear order as described above would
expose the Greek army to cavalry attacks for the following ten days. Moreover,
some of the Greek regiments would have to camp in the plain west of Asopos
ridge, thus they would be constantly exposed to cavalry attacks. Therefore, it
may be assumed that Herodotus’ story reflects the battle order at a later
stage, not the actual camp arrangement. In reality the Greek camp should have
been concentrated on the hills of Asopos ridge in a dense well protected
formation. Gargaphia spring must have been inside that protected area allowing
all Greek units to have access to the necessary water supplies.
The Lacedaemonians were the
only ones posted right by the spring; all the other Greeks had some way to go
to reach it (exactly how far depending on where each contingent was deployed).
They did not have far to go to the Asopos, but the Persian cavalry with their
bows and arrows had made it impossible for them to fetch water from the river,
and so, with the Asopos denied them, they had been going to the spring.
(Herodotus, IX.36)
Map 1: The battlefield of Plataea. The green area
represents land below the 310 m elevation above sea level. It represents flat
terrain (altitude 270 – 310 m), which was most suitable for cavalry charges.
The hilly region of Asopos Ridge, which is marked with dark texture, rises
20-60 m above the plain. The two main roads connecting Thebes with Plataea and
Erythrae-Hysiae respectively are marked with yellow lines. The location of the
“Island” is roughly marked on the map since the Oeroe riverbed cannot be
recognized with accuracy in the present day.
Therefore, Herodotus’ comment, that only the Spartans
had taken position near the spring, again concerned a later stage of the battle
when the enemies were preparing for a clash. Indeed, the two enemies challenged
each other attempting to lure their opponents to march into unfavorable
territories. However, both commanders were prudent enough not to cross Asopos.
4. Phase 2 –
Days 3-9
The day after they had all
taken up their positions, people by people and regiment by regiment, both sides
offered up sacrifices. (Herodotus, IX.33) but …The entrails gave favourable
omens for the Greeks if they remained on the defensive, but not if they crossed
the Asopos and took the fight to the enemy. (Herodotus, IX.36)
Mardonius was under pressure to take the offensive
since his position was strategically weak. He knew about the Greek naval
campaign to Ionia. If that expedition succeeded to set Hellespont under Greek
control, his communication and supply lines would have been terminally
cut.
Although Mardonius wanted to
be the one to attack, the entrails also gave him omens that were favourable for
defence but unsuited to attack. He too used the Greek method of divination by
examination of the entrails, (Herodotus, IX.37)
However, Mardonius was not succeeding in luring the
Greeks to make a wrong move. Therefore, he had no other option but to delay his
attack.
Since the omens received not
just by the Persians themselves but also by the Greeks in the Persian army …
warned against engaging the enemy, and because there was a constant influx of
men into the Greek army, which was consequently increasing in size, a Theban
called Timagenidas the son of Herpys advised Mardonius to patrol the passes
over Cithaeron, on the grounds that a great many of the Greeks who were
constantly flooding in every day could be caught there. (Herodotus, IX.38)
5. Phase 3 –
Days 10-14
Additionally, the Thebans advised Mardonius not to
attempt an attack against the hills of Asopos Ridge where the superiority of
the Persian cavalry would not have been effective. As an alternative, they
suggested him to try to cut the supply routes of the Greek army at Cithaeron
hoping that such an action would irritate the Greek commanders and provoke a
counterattack in the plains along the two roads Plataea-Thebes or
Erythrae-Thebes, where the Greek phalanx would be vulnerable to cavalry
attacks.
The two sides had been facing
each other for eight days when Timagenidas put this suggestion to Mardonius.
Realizing that it was a good idea, Mardonius sent his cavalry that night to the
pass on Cithaeron which leads towards Plataea— the pass known to the Boeotians
as Three Heads, and to the Athenians as Oak Heads. This was an effective
mission for the Persian horsemen, because they captured fifty yoke-animals
(along with their carters) as they were coming down on to the plain with food
from the Peloponnese for the Greek army. But once they had taken this prey the
Persians turned to indiscriminate murder, slaughtering humans and animals
alike. When they had had their fill of killing, they rounded up the remnants of
the baggage train and drove them back to Mardonius and the Persian encampment.
(Herodotus, IX.39)
The success of the Persian attack certainly made the
Greek commanders nervous. The next day they attempted to block the road from
Thebes to Plataea by a solid line of hoplites spanning all the plain between
Asopos Ridge and Pyrgos Hill. Probably, the battle order described by Herodotus
above refers to that phase of the battle.
Two more days passed after
this incident, with neither side being prepared to start the battle. The
Persians advanced right up to the Asopus to test the Greeks, but neither side
actually crossed the river. Mardonius’ cavalry, however, was constantly
attacking and harassing the Greeks, because the Thebans (who were staunch and
belligerent supporters of the Persian cause) kept guiding the cavalry to within
striking distance of the enemy, at which point the Persians and Medes would
take over and perform deeds of valour. (Herodotus, IX.40)
In spite of the strong pressure of the Persian cavalry
at the phalanx, the Greek hoplites held their position, although with many
casualties.
Then Mardonius the son of
Gobryas and Artabazus the son of Pharnaces, who was one of Xerxes’ particular
favourites, held a meeting and discussed the situation. (Herodotus, IX.41)
Then in the eleventh day after the Greeks camped on
Asopos Ridge (probably the twelfth or the thirteenth day of the battle), the
two top commanders of the Persian army, namely Mardonius and Artabazus had a
long discussion on the strategy to be followed. The reason for this discussion
might be new information coming from East concerning the Persian naval defeat
in the battle of Mycale. Mardonius became now desperate for a quick victory,
otherwise his communication route to Asia was in severe danger. The strategic
disadvantage of the Persian position was heavily weighing in his mind and could
easily lead to tactical errors.
During that discussion Artabazus expressed the opinion
that their position was very delicate and risky, and suggested to withdraw to
Asia or at least to Thebes or Thessaly as soon as possible. However, Mardonius
had invested too much of his personal reputation in the conquest of Greece and
was not interested in a safe but inglorious return home. Hence he decided for
an attack despite the difficulties. His plan for the battle is not precisely
known and has to be guessed from Herodotus’ narration.
After Mardonius’ question
about the oracles and his words of encouragement night fell and guards were
posted. Late at night, when both camps had apparently fallen quiet and almost
everyone was asleep, Alexander the son of Amyntas, the commander and king of
the Macedonians, rode up to the Athenian sentries and asked to meet with their
commanders. (Herodotus, IX.44)
On hearing this report the
Athenian commanders lost no time in following the sentries back to their posts,
where they met up with Alexander. ‘Men of Athens,’ Alexander said, ‘please take
what I have to say to you as a token of my good faith. You must keep it to
yourselves and tell no one except Pausanias, because otherwise you might
destroy me. … So I’m telling you that Mardonius and the Persian army have found
it impossible to receive favourable omens from their sacrifices; if they had,
battle would have been joined long ago. But now he has decided to ignore the
omens and to attack at dawn— I imagine because he is afraid of your army
increasing any further in size. Get ready to face an attack, then. In fact,
even if he puts it off and does not join battle, you should just maintain your
position and be patient, because he only has enough supplies left for a few
days. (Herodotus, IX.45)
The nightly visit of Alexander to the Athenian camp
has raised many discussions among the modern historians. If the exact content
of his message is taken literally, his determination to the Greek cause becomes
questionable. Indeed, he advised the Greeks to keep their positions waiting for
a Persian attack. He was basing his advice on the lack of supplies in the
Persian camp. As Herodotus mentions just a few paragraphs above, the Persians
did not have such a logistical problem: “It
was Artabazus’ opinion that they should strike camp as soon as possible and
withdraw the entire army to the shelter of the walls of Thebes, where there was
a good stock of supplies for them and plenty of fodder for the yoke-animals.
(Herodotus, IX.41)”. If Alexander was communicating wrong information, was
he actually a traitor and not a hero for the Greeks? Was he sent by Mardonius
to confuse the Greek commanders by advising them to retain their defensive
position across the south bank of Asopos?
The Athenian commanders went
straight to the right wing and passed on to Pausanias the information Alexander
had given them. His response to their report, because he was afraid of the
Persians, was to say, ‘So battle is to be joined at dawn. You Athenians had
better take on the Persians, while we meet the Boeotians and the other Greeks
who are currently ranged against you. You’re familiar with Persian tactics,
because you’ve already fought them at Marathon, while we are untried and
ignorant of them. On the other hand, while we may have no experience of the
Persians, we are experts in Boeotians and Thessalians. So go and collect your
gear, and then move over to this wing, while we swap with you and take the left
wing.’ (Herodotus, IX.46)
This information raises another question: If Alexander
advised the Greeks to stay at their current positions protecting the road
Thebes – Plataea, why did they move immediately after the message had reached
them? A possible explanation is that Herodotus mixed the exact information he
obtained from eyewitnesses with his own thoughts or perceptions. The manoeuvres
of the Greek army indicate that they received a different message to the one
reported by Herodotus. A reasonable explanation of the tactical moves of the
Greeks is that Alexander informed them that the Persians were planning to
attack along the Thebes – Erythrae road in the next morning. Therefore, if they
remained in their original position across the Thebes – Plataea road, the
Persians could have captured the exit of the Eleutherae pass and outflank the
Greeks threatening seriously their supply routes.
The reallocation of the Athenian regiment at the right
of the Spartans probably means that the Athenians were sent to protect the road
Thebes – Erythrae. Hence they moved from Pyrgos hill to the east slopes of
Asopos Ridge. Early the next morning more moves of various units took place,
which are difficult to interpret.
Since both parties liked the
arrangement, they set about exchanging positions as day began to break. The
Boeotians, however, realized what was going on and told Mardonius, who
immediately tried to make changes within his forces too, by bringing the
Persians across to face the Lacedaemonians. When this came to Pausanias’
attention, he realized that his manoeuvre had been detected, so he led the
Spartiates back to the right wing, and Mardonius followed his example with
regard to his left wing. (Herodotus, IX.47)
The analysis of these manoeuvres is intriguing. Most
probably, Mardonius discovered that his plan did not take the Greeks by
surprise, as he was expecting. Then realizing that the Greek defence was now
weaker at the Plataea road, he ordered his cavalry to attack again along that
road. The Athenians hastily returned back to the old position, but the whole
Greek line was now disordered leaving several weak points. In this way, the
cavalry found their way through to Gargaphia spring and destroyed it.
.. he (Mardonius) ordered his
cavalry to charge the Greek lines. Every unit of the Greek army took casualties
from the javelins and arrows of the Persian cavalry as they bore down on them,
since they were faced with expert mounted archers to whom they could not get
close. The Persian cavalry also churned up and blocked the Gargaphian Spring, which
had been supplying the whole Greek army with fresh water. (Herodotus, IX.49)
The Greek position has become difficult. They had
suffered many casualties the day before, and they had lost their water supply.
Moreover, they had to defend a very long front of about eight kilometres long,
which was exceeding the strength of their forces. A reasonable reaction would
be to retreat towards Cithaeron.
Under these circumstances the
Greek commanders met with Pausanias on the right wing to discuss various
matters, including the loss of the army’s water supply and their harassment by
the Persian cavalry. There were other items on the agenda because these events
were not the only or even the main problems facing them: they had also run out
of provisions, and the retainers of theirs who had been dispatched to the
Peloponnese to bring them fresh supplies had been cut off by the cavalry and
could no longer get through to the Greek camp. (Herodotus, IX.50)
The upshot of the commanders’
conference was that they decided to move their forces to the island, if the
Persians refrained from joining battle that day. This island is located in
front of the town of Plataea, ten stades away from the Asopos and the
Gargaphian Spring, where they were based at the time. It is a kind of inland
island: a river— the River Oëroë, which the locals hold to be the daughter of
Asopos— divides further upstream on its way down from Cithaeron to the plain
and the two branches of the river remain separate from each other for about
three stades before merging again. So they decided to move here, because then
they would not only have plenty of water, but also the cavalry could not
inflict the casualties on them that they could when they were able to come
straight at them. They decided to make the move during the night, at the time
of the second watch, so that the Persians would not notice them setting out and
also so as to avoid having the cavalry on their heels harassing them. They
decided as well that once they had reached this new site … they would dispatch
half their troops to Cithaeron under cover of darkness to meet up with the
retainers of theirs who had gone to fetch supplies and were trapped on
Cithaeron. (Herodotus, IX.51)
6. The final
confrontation
On the following day the plains and the low hills of
the land between Asopos River and Cithaeron Mountain witnessed the greatest
battle of the classical era. Approximately one hundred and fifty thousand men
participated in a battle, which took place in a much extended battlefield
(approximately 10 x 5 km). Mardonius had the tactical advantage of a larger
army which consisted of different units with complementary capabilities. He had
in his disposition heavy and light cavalry, a large body of Asian archers and a
phalanx with heavily armoured Boeotian hoplites. This last addition was an
innovation for the Persian army and gave important flexibility to his plans.
On the opposite side, the Greeks solely relied on
their heavy infantry, which was 38,500 men strong according to Herodotus.
Herodotus also refers to a numerous body of 63,000 lightly armed men on the
Greek side. However the events of the battle indicate that the Greeks were
lacking the support of a light infantry. For example, in the last day of the
battle, the Spartans asked the Athenians to send them their archers (“If for some reason you can’t come
yourselves, please send us your archers…” Herodotus, IX.60). This fact
indicates that the Spartans had a limited light infantry support. Therefore, we
may estimate that the total light infantry of the Greek army did not exceed
10,000 soldiers. The lack of versatility of the Greek army was limiting its
tactical flexibility.
The battle was complex and difficult to analyze.
Different units were moving independently to each other over a wide landscape
and fighting was intense at several locations of the battlefield
simultaneously. The commanders had great difficulties in coordinating the
movements of their troops and had to use mounted messengers to communicate
their orders. The eyewitnesses who
provided information about the battle to Herodotus could not have a complete
view of the actions, so the synchronization of the events as presented by
Herodotus is doubtful. The analysis of these complex battle tactics requires
the careful reading of Herodotus’ story as a first step.
After they reached these
decisions, the whole of the rest of the day was taken up with the constant
burden of cavalry attacks, until the horsemen disengaged late in the afternoon.
Night fell and the time agreed for departure arrived. The bulk of the army
broke camp and left, but they had no intention of going to the appointed place:
as soon as they started out, all they wanted to do was get away from the
Persian cavalry, so they headed for the town of Plataea. On the way, however,
they came to the temple of Hera, which stands in front of the town, twenty
stades away from the Gargaphian Spring, and took up a position in front of it.
(Herodotus, IX.52)
So they established themselves
by the temple of Hera. Now, when Pausanias saw them leaving the camp he assumed
that they were going to the appointed place, so he instructed the
Lacedaemonians to collect their gear as well and follow the others’ lead. Most
of his officers were prepared to obey Pausanias, but Amompharetus the son of
Poliadas, who was the commander in charge of the company from Pitana, declared
that as long as he had any say in the matter he would never bring shame to
Sparta by retreating from the ‘strangers’. (Herodotus, IX.53)
So Pausanias and Euryanax[7]
were trying to win over Amompharetus, since the Lacedaemonians and Tegeans had
been left behind on their own. Meanwhile, the Athenians had also not moved from
their post, … Once most of the army had decamped, they sent one of their men on
horseback … to ask Pausanias for instructions.
(Herodotus, IX.54)
Pausanias then … turned to the
Athenian, who had asked the question he had been sent with, and told him to let
the Athenians know the difficulty of his situation; he requested that they link
up with the Lacedaemonians and, as far as the withdrawal was concerned, that
they follow the Lacedaemonian lead. (Herodotus, IX.55)
The messenger returned to the
Athenian lines. As day began to break, the Lacedaemonians had still not
resolved their differences. All this time Pausanias had stayed put, but now he
judged— rightly, as it turned out— that Amompharetus would not let himself be
left behind if the rest of the Lacedaemonians marched away, so he gave the
order and began to lead all the Lacedaemonians except for Amompharetus and his
men away through the hills, and the Tegeans fell in behind them. As instructed,
the Athenians took the alternate route from that taken by the Lacedaemonians:
whereas the Lacedaemonians kept to the hillocks and the spurs of Cithaeron
because they were afraid of the Persian cavalry, the Athenians made their way
down to the plain. (Herodotus, IX.56)
… when Pausanias’ troops were
some way off, he (Amompharetus) saw that they really were abandoning him, so
when his company had collected their gear he (Amompharetus) led them at a slow
pace towards the other column, which had opened up a gap of about four stades
and had halted on the River Moloeis, at a place called Argiopius (where there
is also a sanctuary of Demeter of Eleusis), to wait for Amompharetus’ company.
… Just as Amompharetus and his men met up with the rest of the Lacedaemonians,
the Persian cavalry attacked in full force. (Herodotus, IX.57)
(Mardonius) he led the
Persians at the double across the Asopus and after the Greeks, who he believed
were trying to run away. In actual fact it
was only the Lacedaemonians and Tegeans that he went for, because the knolls
blocked his view of the Athenians, who had headed for the plain. As
soon as the officers in charge of the remaining units of the invading army saw
the Persians setting out in pursuit of the Greeks, they gave the signal for
their men to join in the chase, and before long an undisciplined and chaotic
mob of shouting soldiers was running as fast as they could after the Greeks,
convinced that they would make short work of them. (Herodotus, IX.59)
As soon as the cavalry began
to attack his men, Pausanias sent a messenger on horseback to the Athenians
with the following message: ‘Men of Athens, the main battle is about to begin,
and the outcome will decide whether Greece is to be free or enslaved…In fact,
though, they have come in full force against us, so you should come and support
us, since we are the ones who are particularly hard pressed. If for some reason
you can’t come yourselves, please send us your archers…’ (Herodotus, IX.60)
On receiving this message, the
Athenians wanted to go and provide all the help they could, but when they were
on their way they were set upon by the pro-Persian Greeks who had been deployed
against them. This attack put them under so much pressure that they found it
impossible to go and help the Lacedaemonians. … they (Lacedaemonians) were
about to join battle with Mardonius and as much of his army as was there, but
the omens were unfavourable, and many of their men fell, with many more
wounded, while the sacrifices were taking place, because the Persians formed
their wickerwork shields into a barricade and continuously rained arrows down
on the Greeks. In this situation, with the Spartiates under heavy pressure and
the omens unfavourable, Pausanias looked towards the Plataeans’ temple of Hera,
invoked the goddess, and asked her not to let their hopes prove to be false.
(Herodotus, IX.61)
Pausanias was in the middle of
his prayers when the Tegeans precipitately started forward to attack the
Persians, and then, just as Pausanias finished praying, the Lacedaemonians
received good omens. Now that the situation was at last favourable, the
Lacedaemonians proceeded to attack the Persians as well, and the Persians laid
aside their bows and prepared to meet them head on. The first phase of the
battle took place at the wickerwork barricade, until that was knocked down, and
then a fierce battle raged for a long time around the temple of Demeter.
Eventually the two sides ended up grappling with each other, as the Persians
caught hold of the Greeks’ spears and broke them off short. In courage and
strength the Persians and the Greeks were evenly matched, but the Persians wore
no armour; besides, they did not have the skill and expertise of their
opponents. They would rush forward ahead of the main body of troops, one by
one, or in groups of ten or so, and attack the Spartiates, only to be cut down.
(Herodotus, IX.62)
Mardonius rode into battle on
his white horse, surrounded by his elite battalion of a thousand first-rate
soldiers, and wherever he put in a personal appearance the Persians made things
particularly difficult for their opponents. As long as Mardonius was alive, the
Persians held their ground and fought back, inflicting heavy casualties on the
Lacedaemonians. But after he had been killed and the men of his battalion, the
most effective troops on the Persian side, had been cut down, all the others
turned and fled before the Lacedaemonians. Their destruction was due more than
anything else to the fact that they wore no armour: it was a case of light-armed
soldiers taking on hoplites. (Herodotus, IX.63)
When the Persians were routed
by the Lacedaemonians at Plataea, they fled in disorder back to their encampment
and to the wooden stronghold they had built on Theban land. (Herodotus, IX.65)
Although the rest of the
Greeks on the Persian side deliberately fought below their best, the battle
between the Boeotians and the Athenians lasted a long time, because those of
the Thebans who had collaborated with the enemy were fully committed to the
battle and refused to fight below their full capabilities. The outcome was that
their three hundred best and bravest men were killed at Plataea by the
Athenians. When the Boeotian forces too were beaten back, they retreated to
Thebes, but by a different route to the one taken by the Persians and the rest
of the allied troops on the Persian side, all of whom— the full complement—
fled without having struck a single blow or displayed any courage at all.
(Herodotus, IX.67)
In the end, then, the whole
Persian army was beaten back, except for the cavalry (and especially the
Boeotian cavalry), which proved invaluable to those who were fleeing, because
they stayed on the side nearest the enemy and so shielded their allies, as they
fled, from the victorious Greeks, who gave chase, harrying and slaughtering men
from Xerxes’ army. (Herodotus, IX.68)
During this rout, word reached
the rest of the Greeks (the ones who had taken up a position by the temple of
Hera and had not taken part in the fighting) that a battle had taken place
which Pausanias and his men had won. As soon as they heard the news, they set
out in complete disarray. The Corinthians and the units deployed near them took
the high road and headed straight for the sanctuary of Demeter following the
foothills and knolls, while the Megarians, Phleiasians, and so on made their
way through the level ground of the plain. As the Megarians and Phleiasians
drew near the enemy, they were spotted by the Theban cavalry under Asopodorus
the son of Timander. The Thebans could see that there was no discipline to
their hasty approach, so they charged into the attack, cut down six hundred of
them, and chased the scattered survivors back to Cithaeron. (Herodotus, IX.69)
The battle began during the night when the Greek
regiments decided to retreat towards Cithaeron. Here is a summary of the events
that followed:
1) All the Greek units except the Spartans and the
Athenians were ordered to move towards Plataea and hold position at a place
called Oeroe island which lies between two branches of the river Oeroe. That
position was along the Plataea – Thebes road as Pausanias the geographer
reports. However, this army moved further to the south and took position in
front of the temple of Hera in order to “get
away from the Persian cavalry”.
2) The Spartans also began to move but with a delay. One
of their units (a company) stubbornly delayed its retreat.
3) The Athenians communicated with the Spartans by a
mounted messenger. They received the instruction to “link up with the Lacedaemonians and, as far as the withdrawal was
concerned, that they follow the Lacedaemonian lead”.
4) At dawn the Lacedaemonians finally moved. However, the
company that was refusing to retreat held its position.
5) After the main body of the Spartan army moved about
800 m, the “rebellious” company also started moving but at a slow pace. They
finally caught up with the rest of the Spartans.
6) When Mardonius found out that the Greeks had
retreated, he ordered an immediate attack against the Lacedaemonians. From his
position he could see only the Spartans and the Tegeans moving south along the
higher ground of Asopos Ridge.
7) The Athenians were moving on a lower ground and
could not be seen by the Persians. Considering that they were positioned at the
left wing of the Greek battle line, they were probably marching along the west
slopes of Asopos Ridge, while the Persians were attacking the Spartans at its
east slopes. This scenario raises another question: If the Athenians had been marching along a path which was visible from the
Thebes-Plataea road, they should have been spotted by the pro-Persian cavalry
which was attacking the rest of the Greek forces near Plataea. Herodotus, however, does not mention any
engagement between the Athenian and the pro-Persian cavalry. Therefore, the Athenians probably took a road which
was crossing the hills of Asopos Ridge.
8) The Persian cavalry was the first to attack the
Lacedaemonians. As a result the Spartans could not retreat anymore and took
defensive position near a place protected by the gully of a tributary of Asopos
called Moloeis.
9) In the meantime the Mardonius’ light infantry which
consisted of the Persian and other Asian units advanced and after making
contact with the Lacedaemonians started pouring arrows against them.
10) The Spartans kept their line but did not counterattack
despite their casualties due to the arrows.
11) Pausanias sent a mounted messenger to the Athenians
asking for help.
12) The Athenians rushed to help the Spartans but at that
moment the Boeotian heavy infantry attacked them. The two enemy Greek armies
got engaged in a fierce battle, where the Athenians won.
13) At the time Pausanias asked for help from the Athenian
regiment, he also ordered his hoplites to attack the Asian archers. After the
Spartan phalanx came in close contact with the light Asian infantry heavy
fighting took place.
14) The Asian infantry did not have the weaponry to cope
against the Spartan phalanx. Mardonius with his elite troops fought bravely
refusing to retreat. When he was killed, the Persian battle line collapsed.
15) The Persians fled to their fortified camp pursued by
the Spartans.
16) The army of the other Greek cities joined the battle but
suffered many casualties when the Boeotian and probably the Thessalian
cavalries attacked them.
17) The Boeotians found refuge back to Thebes retreating
along a different road to the one taken by the Persians. They had lost 300
hoplites in the battle with the Athenians.
Although the description of the battle by Herodotus is
exciting and detailed, the information includes discrepancies and several of
the actions cannot be easily justified. Many questions are raised:
1) Why did the Spartans wait in their original position
until dawn?
2) Why did the Spartans sustain the shower of the Persian
arrows without reacting? What were they waiting for?
3) What was the path followed by the Athenians? Why they could not be seen by Mardonius? Was
this accidental or intentional? What was
their actual role in the battle?
4) Why was Mardonius taken by surprise and failed to
retreat to a safer place when the Spartans charged? His cavalry could have
intervened to allow the safe retreat of the Persian infantry when their assault
failed. Why did they fail to do so?
5) What was the role of the army of the small Greek
cities? Why were they sent to a position far away from the Lacedaemonians?
Keeping all the Greek army united would have been safer. If they had actually
taken position near the walls of Plataea, how is it possible to chase the
Persians who were east of Asopos Ridge?
6) What was the role of the medizing Greek cavalry? Why
they were not able to see the Athenians who were marching at the west slopes of
Asopos Ridge, while they were attacking the Greeks who had taken position near
Plataea. If the Athenians were marching at the plain along the Thebes - Plataea
road, the cavalry should have spotted them and attacked them.
Despite its discrepancies, a second careful reading of
Herodotus’ narration may give clues of what actually happened during that
dramatic morning. Here is a plausible interpretation of those events:
When the Greek commanders met in the night before the
final battle, they realized their difficult position. If the Persians managed to cut their supply
lines, they had to step down to the plain and fight in an unfavourable terrain.
At this difficult moment the Greek commanders proved their superior tactical
skills. They worked out a battle plan which was by far superior to what an
average general would expect. Who was the mind behind this ingenious stratagem
is not known with certainty. Pausanias, who was the commander-in-chief,
certainly had a strong contribution to the development of the plan. However,
Aristides with his great experience of previous battles with the Persians
(Marathon and Salamis) most probably helped as well. After all, this battle
plan had a strong flavour of the Athenian way of thinking. In a difficult
situation the Athenians were recognizing only opportunities not threats.
The Greeks based their plan on the current psychology
of Mardonius. After his successes of the previous days, his increased self
confidence made him susceptible to tactical errors. Therefore, it would be
easier to lure him into a trap. However, they knew that Mardonius and his
commanding officers were experienced and it would not be easy to deceive them.
The Greek generals had to provide a bait, large enough to make the trap
irresistible. Such a piece of bait would be a large division of the Greek army.
In particular the mighty Lacedaemonian regiment would be a really tempting and
hard to refuse offer. The Greek generals knew that the Lacedaemonians despite
their high military skill, if separated from the rest of the Greek army and had
to face the bulk of the Persian army their chances to get through would be very
limited, so they were a convincing bait. Therefore, it was decided that the
Spartans would take the role of the bait. After all the Spartans were the only
Greek unit which had the training and the discipline to play this difficult
role and escape.
After selecting the bait, the Greek generals had to
set the trap. A second Greek division would hide and surprise the enemy who
would run for the bait. This second Greek army had to be very disciplined and
determined. This role was given to the Athenians assisted by the Plataeans, who
had excellent knowledge of the landscape. The concept of a vanishing army of
8,500 hoplites, who managed to become invisible in a treeless landscape by
exploiting just the screening effect of low hills of only 30-50 m height, is
really incredible. Only the most imaginative strategist commanding a well
disciplined army could conceive and execute such a trick.
The plan required a third Greek division for covering
up the trap. That regiment had to be numerous but it would have limited
participation in the fighting. The role of this third Greek army would be to
confuse Mardonius so that the hiding Athenians would skip the attention of the
Persians. Indeed, when in that early morning Mardonius saw a numerous Greek
army taking battle position in front of Plataea protecting the Dryos Kefalae
pass, and the Lacedaemonians rushing towards Erythrae, he could not suspect
that a third Greek army was hiding among the hills of Asopos Ridge.
With the first light of that fatal day, Mardonius saw
the battle line of his enemies in a very favourable arrangement for his plans.
He immediately worked out a plan to exploit the division of the Greek forces.
He first decided to send the Boeotian cavalry probably assisted by a few light
Asian units against the bulk of the Greek forces which were protecting the road
to Plataea. He was expecting that the cavalry attacks would immobilize these
hoplites, so they could not offer any help to the Lacedaemonians. Then he
directed all of his best units against the Spartans. These included the Persian
cavalry, the Persian light infantry and the Boeotian heavy infantry. His plan
was to attack the Spartans through the Erythrae road first by the cavalry, and
then by all his infantry units. He was planning to outflank the Lacedaemonian
phalanx by using his numeric superiority and surround the Spartans. For this
reason he ordered an attack along two lines. The Persian cavalry and infantry
attacked along the Erythrae road at the right wing of the Spartans. Then the
medizing Greeks, mostly Theban hoplites marched through the hills of Asopos
Ridge to attack the left wing of the Lacedaemonians. This last division of the
Persian army was roughly equal in number to the Lacedaemonian army and
similarly equipped. Therefore, the Spartans would have to fight against an
almost equivalent phalanx supported by a much more numerous Asian light
infantry of approximately 40,000 men and the Persian cavalry. The defence of
the Spartans would be even more difficult considering that the attack would
take place from two different directions. Now Mardonius was certain for his
victory.
The cavalry attacking the army of the small Greek
cities, which was retreating towards Plataea, had an easy job. The units of
that Greek phalanx which were exposed in a low ground suffered heavy blows and
had to retreat uphill to the temple of Hera near Plataea (see above Herodotus,
IX.52). It was probably in this phase of the battle that the Megarians and the
Phleiasians suffered heavy casualties since they were holding the right wing of
that Greek phalanx and were positioned at a lower ground where they were more
exposed to cavalry attacks. Herodotus wrongly reports this incident at the last
stage of the battle, probably because his Athenian sources (eyewitnesses)
wished to underestimate the contribution of the Megarians and the Corinthians
in the victory. It is more reasonable to assume that at the end of the battle
the Boeotian cavalry was more interested in securing the retreat of the
defeated Theban infantry back to their city rather than attacking Plataea.
In the mean time, the Persians crossed Asopos and ran
after the Spartans. First the cavalry attacked and forced the Spartans to stop
their retreat towards Hysiae and resume battle position. Then the Persian
infantry approached marching along the Erythrae road and started shooting
arrows against the Lacedaemonians. The phalanx of the Thebans was advancing
probably through the hills of Asopos Ridge aiming to attack the left wing of
the Spartans. Both the Persians and the Thebans did not suspect the presence of
the hiding Athenians and Plataeans. Moreover, the Boeotian cavalry, which was
attacking the Greeks along the Plataea road, also failed to see the Athenians.
The Athenians led by Plataean guides had crossed the plain from Pyrgos Hill to
Asopos Ridge in the darkness of the night before, and took position at a lower
ground among the hills. Thus they made themselves invisible from both the
Plataea and Erythrae roads exploiting what is known as the “illusion of the low
hills”. Low hills separated by gullies can hide large numbers of soldiers,
while if there are mountains in the background, the viewer gets the impression
of seeing an empty landscape. Other famous generals, such as Hannibal[8] or
Frederick the Great[9],
exploited this deception for setting traps.
Figure 1: Elevation profile along an
E-W cross section of Asopus Ridge at about halfway between Cithaeron’s feet and
Asopos River. Points A and D correspond to the Thebes-Plataea and
Thebes-Erythrae roads respectively. Positions B and C are invisible from both A
and D view points. In particular, position B is the most probable hiding place
of the Athenians.
As in Salamis, a fatal trap was set for the Persians
proving the tactical superiority of the Greek high command. As the Thebans were
approaching the Spartans, Pausanias, who was able to observe the whole
battlefield, signalled the Athenians by a mounted messenger that this was the
time to get out of their hideout. At the same time he ordered the Spartan
phalanx forward. Mardonius was waiting in vain for the Thebans to appear. Using
his elite squadron he was intervening at all the critical points of the Persian
battle line attempting to keep his position until the Thebans arrived. But the
Thebans had been engaged in battle with the Athenians and never came to his
support. Mardonius was killed fighting bravely. Then the Persian battle order
collapsed.
Artabazus was commanding various Asian regiments and
he was assigned to protect the central area of the battlefield which lies
between the two roads to Plataea and Erythrae. As soon as he saw the defeat of
the Persians, he gathered the survivors and using the protection of his
cavalry, withdrew towards Thessaly taking with him the bulk of the Persian
forces that escaped the battle. Artabazus made no effort to save the supplies
gathered in the fortified Persian camp since he knew that he did not have
enough forces to defend it. After all, his main intention was to move as fast
as possible to Minor Asia in order to save the Persian presence there.
Now, Artabazus the son of
Pharnaces had disapproved of the campaign right from the very start, when
Mardonius had been left in Greece by Xerxes, and had often tried, without
success, to dissuade Mardonius from joining battle. Since he was unhappy with
Mardonius’ tactics anyway, then, this is what he did. He was responsible for a
sizeable force of about forty thousand men, and because he had no doubts about
the final outcome of the battle that was under way, he had them adopt a tight
formation and told them to follow his lead wherever he went and at whatever
pace he set. Having issued these instructions he marched them out as if they
were going to join the battle. When they were some way down the road, however,
he saw that the Persians were already in flight. At that point he changed
formation and began to run as fast as possible away from the battlefield, but
not towards the stronghold or Thebes with its defensive walls. Instead, he made
for Phocis, because he wanted to get to the Hellespont without delay.
(Herodotus, IX.66)
Soon after the battle the Greeks attacked the
fortified Persian camp which was probably defended by a small garrison that did
not manage to escape with Artabazus. After a short siege, they managed to break
in. The spoils were plenty and rich beyond any imagination.
The main body of the invading
army, including the Persians, had taken refuge inside their wooden stronghold.
They managed to climb up the towers before the Lacedaemonians arrived, and then
they reinforced its walls as best they could. The Lacedaemonian attack
initiated a fairly tough battle for the wall, because until the Athenians
arrived the defenders were getting the better of the Lacedaemonians, who did
not know how to go about attacking fortified structures. But once the Athenians
attacked the stronghold, a fierce and protracted battle took place. Eventually,
thanks to their courage and persistence, the Athenians succeeded in scaling the
wall and making enough of a breach in it for the Greeks to pour in. The first to
enter the stronghold were the Tegeans, and it was they who plundered Mardonius’
pavilion, from which they took various objects including the manger Mardonius
had used for his horses. (Herodotus, IX.70)
Herodotus reports only a small number of casualties among
the Spartans and the Athenians. It is not clear whether these numbers refer to
the battle of the last day or for the full duration of the hostilities. Anyway,
if these numbers are correct, they prove that the trap worked very efficiently.
The Persian casualties are usually exaggerated. As it was explained above, most
Persian units are expected to escape under the protection of their cavalry.
… a total of 91 Lacedaemonians
from Sparta lost their lives in the battle, along with 16 Tegeans and 52
Athenians. (Herodotus, IX.70)
The Persians were the best of
the infantry from the invading army, while the best cavalry unit was that of
the Sacae, and the individual prize for valour was held to belong to Mardonius.
On the Greek side, although both the Tegeans and the Athenians proved their
worth, the Lacedaemonians outshone everyone else. (Herodotus, IX.71)
Herodotus praises the Spartans as deserving the prize
of valour more than any other Greek regiment. However, he is not explicit
whether the prize was actually given to them. On the contrary, Plutarch is his
“Life of Aristides” reports a
different story:
After this, the Athenians not
yielding the honour of the day to the Lacedaemonians, nor consenting they
should erect a trophy, things were not far from being ruined by dissension
among the armed Greeks; had not Aristides, by much soothing and counselling the
commanders, especially Leocrates and Myronides, pacified and persuaded them to
leave the thing to the decision of the Greeks. And on their proceeding to
discuss the matter, Theogiton, the Megarian, declared the honour of the victory
was to be given some other city, if they would prevent a civil war; after him
Cleocritus of Corinth rising up, made people think he would ask the palm for
the Corinthians (for next to Sparta and Athens, Corinth was in greatest
estimation); but he delivered his opinion, to the general admiration, in favour
of the Plataeans; (Plutarch –Aristides 20)
Despite the anecdotic character of the above incident,
which is typical in Plutarch’s narrations, this event, if actual, strengthens
the theory of the trap as presented above. Although some details may be
fabricated to make Plutarch’s story pleasant and exciting to the reader, the
final decision of the Greeks to award the prize of valour to the Plataeans
demonstrates their critical role in setting up the trap by guiding the
Athenians to the exact place where they were invisible to all enemies.
After the battle of Plataea, the Persians withdrew
from Southern Greece. They tried to save their strongholds in Macedonia and
Thrace, but this was possible only for a short time.
References
Cartledge P. (2013), “After Thermopylae: The Oath of Plataea and the End of
the Graeco-Persian Wars”, Oxford University Press, NY 10016, USA.
Green P. (1996), “The Greco-Persian wars”, University of California Press,
Ltd.
Macaulay G. C. (1890), “The History
of Herodotus”, Macmillan, London and NY.
Mystriotis A. (2019), “The years that gave birth to
Democracy: 507-450 B.C.”, Amazon – Kindle edition 2019.
Rawlinson G. (1996), “The History of
Herodotus”, Wordsworth Editions Limited. Provided by The Internet Classics
Archive at http://classics.mit.edu//Herodotus/history.html
Shepherd W. and Dennis P. (2012), “Plataea 479 BC: Greece's greatest
victory”, Osprey Publishing, Oxford OX2 0PH, UK.
Waterfield R., and Dewald C. (1998),
“Herodotus - The Histories”, (Oxford World's Classics), Oxford University
Press.
[1] This article is also included
as an Appendix in the book The years that gave birth to Democracy: 507- 450 B.C. (Amazon Kindle edition 2019).
[2] About three times the number
of soldiers who participated in the battle of Marathon.
[3] For more details about
Themistocles’ strategic plan see Mystriotis (2019).
[4] The perioeci were also
Lacedaemonians but of an inferior military training than the elite Spartan
hoplites. Their name indicates that they were living outside the city of
Sparta.
[5] A stade approximately equals
180 m.
[6] Tegea was a city in Arcadia,
north of Sparta. It traditionally was a close ally of Sparta. In the battle of
Plataea, the Tegeans fought together with the Spartans during the decisive last
day of the battle.
[7] Euryanax was Pausanias’
cousin and his co-commander of the Spartan army in the battle of Plataea
[8] In the battle of Trevia
River, Hannibal hid one thousand horsemen and one thousand hoplites in a gully
of a tributary of Trevia. As the Roman army advanced the hiding troops found
themselves at the back of the enemy and attacked from behind.
[9] Battle of Rossbach
